TRCT: A traceable anonymous transaction protocol for blockchain
发表信息
作者
- Junke Duan
- Licheng Wang
- Wei Wang
- Lize Gu
笔记
Anonymous cryptocurrencies are distributed applications based on blockchain technology that enhance the anonymity of user transactions. However, they also provide cover for many criminal activities. Existing traceable modifications of anonymous transaction protocols do not support public verification of the traceability of transactions, meaning dishonest users can still evade tracing by forging partial proofs. In this paper, we first propose EPoK, which is a partially extractable zero-knowledge proof scheme designed to address this issue. We provide the instantiation of EPoK, as well as its formal security proofs. Combined with EPoK and the classic anonymous transaction protocol RingCT, we propose a traceable anonymous transaction protocol TRCT for tracing participants’ addresses and transaction amounts in anonymous transactions. Compared to previous works, TRCT is the first to implement public verification of the transaction’s traceability while still maintaining anonymity. This ensures that users cannot forge relevant proofs to evade tracing. We present and prove the security properties of TRCT, and experimentally compare its efficiency with the original RingCT protocol. The result shows that the extra overhead generated by TRCT is small.
匿名加密货币是基于区块链技术的分布式应用，能够增强用户交易的匿名性。然而，这也为许多犯罪活动提供了掩护。现有的可追踪匿名交易协议的改进版本不支持对交易可追踪性的公开验证，这意味着不诚实的用户仍可以通过伪造部分证明来逃避追踪。在本文中，我们首先提出了EPoK（部分可提取零知识证明方案），这是一个专门用于解决这个问题的方案。我们提供了EPoK的实例化方案以及其形式化安全性证明。
结合EPoK和经典的匿名交易协议RingCT（环形加密交易），我们提出了一个可追踪匿名交易协议TRCT（可追踪环形加密交易），用于追踪匿名交易中参与者的地址和交易金额。与之前的工作相比，TRCT是首个在保持匿名性的同时实现交易可追踪性公开验证的协议。这确保了用户无法通过伪造相关证明来逃避追踪。我们提出并证明了TRCT的安全性特征，并通过实验将其效率与原始RingCT协议进行了比较。结果表明，TRCT产生的额外开销很小。