NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion
发表信息
作者
- Mihir Bellare
- Georg Fuchsbauer
- Alessandra Scafuro
笔记
Motivated by the subversion of “trusted” public parameters in mass-surveillance activities, this paper studies the security of NIZKs in the presence of a maliciously chosen common reference string. We provide definitions for subversion soundness, subversion witness indistinguishability and subversion zero knowledge. We then provide both negative and positive results, showing that certain combinations of goals are unachievable but giving protocols to achieve other combinations.
受到大规模监控活动中”可信”公共参数被破坏的启发，本文研究了在恶意选择的公共参考串(common reference string)存在的情况下非交互式零知识证明(NIZK)的安全性。我们提出了破坏可靠性(subversion soundness)、破坏证人不可区分性(subversion witness indistinguishability)和破坏零知识(subversion zero knowledge)的定义。随后，我们提供了消极和积极的研究结果，表明某些目标的组合是无法实现的，但同时也给出了实现其他组合的协议。